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Abstract: A school of thought on China’s rural unrest contends that rural unrest not only has successfully forced China’s top leaders to introduce measures to improve the economic wellbeing of the rural population but will also democratise the political and social culture in rural areas. While agreeing with its contention about the positive economic outcome of rural political activism, this paper challenges its over-optimistic assessment of the political and social implications of rural unrest. 
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Collective action in China and its social and political implications

(Work in progress, not to be quoted.)


Collective action has become an increasingly prominent feature of the Chinese political and social landscape. Collective action can be peaceful and legal, such as writing letters or paying visits in person to Letters and Visits Offices (信访办公室) at various levels of government. When collective action erupts into public view, it then becomes a ‘mass incident’ (群体性事件). Peaceful mass incidents such as demonstrations, sit-ins, or strikes are sometimes tolerated. Once violence is involved, however slightly, it would give the government the best excuse to suppress them, by force if necessary.  In the post-Mao era, mass incidents not only have increased in number year after year but the number of participants, the intensity of their anger, the degree of organization and co-ordination, and the perseverance of participants have all heightened.​[1]​ From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the most common grievances of rural protestors were corruption in the countryside, excessive use of coercion by rural cadres in enforcing state policies, particularly the policy of birth control, and heavy taxes and other illegal extractions. With the introduction of villagers self-governance in 1987, irregularities in Villagers’ Committee (VC) elections, particularly unlawful interference by township and county officials, have also triggered mass protests. Since the mid-1990s, the most common cause of mass incidents has been land grabs.​[2]​ Villagers have protested against illegal sale of village public land by corrupt cadres, or inadequate compensation for village public land requisitioned by the state, and against land use harmful to the environment.​[3]​ Some of the best known cases of collective action involving large numbers of villagers and ending in violence and bloodshed were related to land dispute.  For example, the Shengyou (绳油)Village incident in Dingzhou (定州) in June 2005, and the Dongzhou (东洲) Township incident in Shanwei (汕尾)　in December 2005.​[4]​ In both incidents, armed police and thugs were used to attack protestors and several tens of villagers were beaten up. In Shengyou at least six people were killed; in Dongzhou the official death toll was three.
 
It is difficult for foreign scholars to do field research on rural unrest. Not many Chinese scholars have worked in this field either, because it involves certain political risk, and because getting government funding is not easy and getting reliable information is even more difficult. Those few Chinese scholars who have chosen to work on it are at least partially motivated by their sympathy for villagers taking collective action. They, however, differ in their assessment of its political and social consequences. In this short paper, I shall focus on the views of those who believe that rural collective action has played and will continue to play a very significant and positive role in reforming rural polity, which will eventually impact on the political system as a whole. This group includes some of the most productive scholars who have been working in this area for many years, and their views are quite influential among academic circles. 

They argue that increased intensity and scale of rural collective resistance has forced Beijing to adjust its policies and make concessions to villagers. This is an uncontroversial point. The Chinese top leaders have indeed become more mindful of the huge gap in living standards between the urban and rural sectors and have adopted measures to try to close it. They have reduced and finally abolished most rural taxes and fees and charges. They have done away with compulsory sale of grain to the state at state-fixed prices. They have reformed the household system to absorb some rural residents in cities. They have increased investment in rural infrastructure and in the provision of public goods and services in rural areas.  All these measures have indeed improved the economic wellbeing of large numbers of villagers but have not been intended to promote democracy in the countryside. One may argue, of course, that the increasing frequency and scale of mass resistance is in itself a sign that the leadership has been pressured to broaden the scope for villagers’ democratic participation, and recognise their right of dissent. It is, however, difficult to prove that the leadership’s conciliatory gesture is purely a reactive response to mass protests and is not the regime’s proactive policy to defuse tension. But this is beside the point. What these scholars maintain is that regardless of what the authorities’ response is, well-organised and successful collective action has by itself strengthened community solidarity, heightened villagers’ political awareness and their sense of political empowerment, acculturated villagers in democratic values and democratic practices, and changed the power structure in rural society. I can understand why this line of argument is attractive to many people in China. When villagers’ self-governance was first introduced, some people had hoped that democratic governance in villages would trigger a bottom-up nation-wide democratisation movement.​[5]​  Two decades on, most of them have been bitterly disappointed, and they are eager to see new signs of a groundswell of a democratic movement in China.

The loose associations in which rural protestors are organised to take collective action, according to some scholars, are providing a network for rural political participation.  These associations, however, do not follow formal democratic procedures in conducting businesses. For instance, they don’t hold elections to elect leaders; they don’t as a rule keep written records of meetings or of financial transactions. This should not surprise us, for no one would expect that a group of disgruntled and deprived villagers gathering together temporarily to achieve a particular goal should worry about drawing up a constitution for their gathering and conducting a formal election to elect leaders. Besides, such informality is necessary to protect themselves and especially their leaders, for to be suspected of engaging in organized resistance is to invite state suppression. But some researchers claim that in spite of this, these associations --if they can be so called-- operate in a democratic way. They say that decision-making, including selection of leaders, planning of strategies and tactics, determination of the amount of members’ contribution and the amount of payment to leaders and activists to compensate for their losses of income, etc., is all done collectively in general meetings of participants. Therefore, they maintain, participation in these activities will help foster democratic values among villagers and teach them the skills necessary for democratic participation. Such an assessment is based on the situations of a few locations where some scholars have conducted research. No one can tell how widespread are these practices in rural protestor organizations throughout China. But even if we confine ourselves to the limited number of cases they have documented, I still think that their view of the role of rural political activism is over-optimistic. 

Let us first see how people emerge as leaders of collective action. It usually begins when villagers have become restless because their complaints have been repeatedly ignored by the township and county governments. A few villagers then meet to consider taking collective action. If they successfully mobilise the majority of villagers to follow them, they will automatically become leaders. If for some reasons, these people don’t want to lead, they will try to persuade those who they believe are more able and willing to lead to come forward. What sort of people eventually become leaders? They are usually better educated and financially more secured than the average villager. They are eloquent communicators (能说会道).  Many have spent some years working in cities, and thus are people who ‘have seen the world’ (见过世面). There is thus a high proportion of demob soldiers, school teachers in rural areas, and urban retirees among them. Those who have ‘good connections’, e.g. people who know journalists and lawyers or/and government officials and public servants sympathetic to their cause, are also eagerly recruited into leadership groups. So are some village roughies and daredevils, people who have always thumbed their noses at law and have always enjoyed a fight, for whatever cause. The last category of people will be most useful in a confrontation with police.  Significantly, one of the most important qualities villagers look for in leaders is the ability to obtain and interpret information. Many leaders have become leaders simply because they can read to villagers certain policy documents related to the issue/s at the centre of their complaint. If someone can point out the discrepancies between official policies favourable to their cause and local practices that harm them; or if someone has ‘insider information’ from private sources which strengthens their case, these persons would be considered heroes and would immediately be elevated to leadership position. ​[6]​  The official documents in question are not classified materials and are readily available to anyone who knows where to find them, but in most cases of collective action, villagers had had no knowledge of their existence before they were read and explained to them by their leaders. What does this tell us? It tells us that there is a great disparity in the command of information resources between the leaders and the led. Now, for an association of protestors to conduct businesses democratically, it is necessary for members to possess a modicum of political efficacy, and the starting point of political efficacy is to be reasonably well-informed. If the only source of information of the rank-and-file is their leaders, it is difficult to imagine that the leader and the led can participate on a more or less equal basis. And there is plenty of evidence to support my contention.

There is a case where collective action had been going on for more than ten years, during which time the authorities had made several concessions but had not met all the protestors’ demands. In the end, most villagers had grown so battle-weary that they did not want  the protest to go on any longer. At a public meeting, however, a few leaders insisted that it should go on, and not a single villager dared to speak up against the leaders, for fear of being called a traitor.​[7]​  In another case, villagers initiated a collective action since 1977 demanding compensation for damages to their fields caused by a dam. In the early 1980s, there were several floods that caused further losses of crops and property. These were clearly two separate issues, and the latter should be dealt with by flood relief agencies. But the leaders of the collective action decided to conflate the two  issues so as to make bigger claims for compensation from the regional government responsible for building the dam. A scholar investigating the case was present at a meeting of protestors, at which a farmer complained to him that the floods had caused him to lose everything. His remarks made the No. 1 leader very angry. He promptly told the farmer to shut up and accused him of being confused and thick-headed. A few days later, when this scholar tried to interview other villagers, they all looked scared, saying that they knew nothing and asking him to speak directly to the leader.​[8]​  

One scholar has been conducting research in a county where farmers have been carrying out collective resistance for a number of years. He says that farmers there have tried to establish a permanent county-wide farmers’ union to articulate and fight for their group interests. Although the government has, as expected, refused to approve the union, he claims that the political clout of the union is such that the county officials have been forced to conduct dialogues with union representatives. He has not elaborated what the dialogues concern or how these union representatives have come about if the union does not exist. That scholar also claims that the popularity and prestige of leaders of collective action is such that  they have emerged as the new political and social elites, edging out both traditional elites such as clan and religious leaders and ‘official’ elites such as Party members and VC members. ​[9]​ To my knowledge, the proposed county-wide Hengyang County farmers’ union which he refers to is an exceptional case in the whole country. All other farmers’ unions that have been proposed or are functioning today, according to this same scholar, are confined to a single township or a single village, and there are very, very few of them.​[10]​ In most other cases of collective action, participants tend to disperse as soon as their goal is achieved or partially achieved. Sometimes, they disperse if their collective action has been forcibly suppressed, if their leaders for whatever reasons have abandoned them, or if their patience and funds have run out. I find it hard to believe that these meteor-like leaders can successfully edge out the traditional and official elites.  In fact, it is not uncommon for official elites such as VC leaders and villagers’ small group leaders, and former VC leaders and former small group leaders, to lead a collective action, because villagers know that these people have more experience in providing leadership, and because incumbent VC leaders and small group leaders are usually more willing than others to play a leading role in defending the collective interests: they would lose mass support if they did not.​[11]​ Some studies also reveal that clan leaders are often leaders or activists in mass incidents.​[12]​ 

But there is no denying that popularly-acclaimed or self-styled leaders have played a decisive role in most collective actions. Nearly all important decisions are made by them, with or without the approval of the masses. It is they who determine the direction and goals of the collective action and the strategies and tactics to be employed. The enormous power these people wield also means that leaders can easily manipulate their followers for their personal ends. I have read a case in which a leader who had violated birth control regulations and refused to pay the fines successfully mobilized some villagers to attack family planning officers when they came to his house to collect overdue fines.​[13]​ Of course, there are many leaders who seem to be people of high principle and ideal. Some of them hold urban residential ID cards and are therefore not qualified to share whatever pecuniary gains a successful protest might bring. Some private entrepreneurs and tradespeople (个体户) who have funded and led collective actions do not engage in agriculture and have no stake in the outcome of the collective action.  But regardless of what motivates them to be leaders or activists, their behaviour is quite similar. They all tend to represent themselves not merely as defenders of the interests of villagers, but more importantly, as defenders of state interests and of the purity of state ideology. They vehemently protest their loyalty to the Party and the state. They blame local officials for blocking the implementation of Beijing’s ‘correct’ policies and accuse them of having betrayed the lofty ideal of communism. This is of course a tactic to win public and high-level official support, but it is also a kind of ‘false consciousness’ in these people, in the sense that it is an official (mis)representation of reality which they have uncritically and subconsciously internalised. But it is exactly this kind of ‘false consciousness’ that has inspired these people to do what they do. The story of a leader is telling. He was imprisoned for three years for the role he had played in a mass incident.  After he was free, his followers gathered to welcome him. At the gathering, he recited a poem written by a Communist Party member killed by the Guomindang (GMD, the Nationalist Party) in the 1920’s. A loose translation of the poem runs something like this :I fear not decapitation as long as the principle I uphold is the truth. After my death, my cause will be taken up by many successors’.​[14]​ And he was not alone in comparing himself to a communist martyr. We are told that many leaders are fond of saying that they don’t fear death, because, quoting Mao, ‘to die for the Party and the people is weightier than Mount Tai’. ​[15]​ One may well admire their heroism, as some mainland China scholars obviously do, but one has to ask whether such a mindset befits a leader of civic participation. Consciously or unconsciously, these leaders are equating their collective resistance with the life-and-death struggle between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the GMD in the civil war. In the CCP official history, the struggle against the GMD was never about power, but was one of good against evil, right against wrong, truth against falsehood. Once a conflict is framed in these moral terms, you already prejudge your opponent to be not your equal, that they are inferior to you, that they are sub-human, and you preclude any possibility of a solution through mutual compromise. This kind of moralism served the goals of the CCP well in the civil war, for what they sought was a regime change where compromise was out of the question. It was the power structure, the dominant social relations, that were evil and needed to be overthrown. In the perception of rural protest leaders today, however, evil is never the existing power structure, but is personified by specific officials. Thus, the battle-cry for most cases of rural collective action is ‘down with greedy officials and foul bureaucrats’ (打倒贪官污吏). Because these popular leaders conceive of the conflict on hand as a heroic and righteous struggle to defeat evil forces, they are not prepared to seek a resolution through bargaining and compromise. This is not to say that they never compromise. In fact, many mass protests ended by both sides making some concessions. But compromise is seldom proactively sought by these popular leaders, and it is seldom part of their strategy. Thus, many rural collective actions in rural China today are very different from cases of civil disobedience or direct action in a democracy. In the latter, the focus of the fight is on issues and not people, and participants treat their opponents and those disagreeing with them as equals and with respect. They are thus prepared to negotiate with their opponents to seek a peaceful resolution through bargaining and compromise. These values and norms that inform civic participation in a democracy are lacking in today’s collective action in rural China. Further, when villagers are led to believe that particular persons are responsible for their suffering, they are led away from investigating structural factors. Take as an example the villagers’ perennial complaint of high taxes and charges and fees, which lay at the heart of many protests before mid-2000s. Protestors nearly always thought that it was corrupt officials who had pocketed their money. Actually, the root cause of the problem was the central government shirking its responsibility to look after the rural population and forcing local officials to fend for themselves the best they could, by hooks and by crooks. ​[16]​ As for corruption, it is indeed rampant. But this can only be rectified by enforcing the rule of law and not just by punishing individual officials. It is this lack of political far-sight that draws criticism from some scholars that rural collective action is too non-political in its orientation.​[17]​

My purpose here is not to denigrate rural political activism. On the contrary, I think villagers have a very clear understanding of the situation they are in, and respond to it rationally. They are up against a hegemonic state apparatus which monopolises all resources, including the right to interpret the law and the power to use force whenever it sees fit. The only way villagers can claim superiority over their opponents is to occupy the high moral ground, and paint their opponents as the blackest of black villains. Journalistic reports on rural collective action by both the Chinese and foreign media, too, tend to endorse uncritically such a simplistic view. The authorities’ readiness to suppress protests by force also reinforces the public perception of their guilt. As a matter of fact, officials’ overreaction to mass protest is partly due to a cultural intolerance of an inferior (in this case, the common people) challenging the authority of a superior (officials). But the modern-day Chinese Communist Party’s personnel management system is probably a far stronger force in shaping official behaviour than tradition. Party and government officials are assessed periodically by their immediate superiors. There is a list of performance criteria against which an official is assessed. Some of these criteria are given more weight than others. Of these, successful maintenance of social stability in areas under the official’s jurisdiction is one of the most important criteria, if not the most important. Failure on this one count will cancel out much of the official’s other good work.​[18]​ It is for this reason that officials are desperate to nib any mass protest in the bud, or at least to contain it within the village or township. What they fear most is for protestors taking their complaints to the provincial capital, and worse still, to Beijing. Township and county officials see protestors, particularly their leaders, as potential wreckers of their careers. This explains why even after the protest has subsided, local officials will often seek revenge on the leaders, and their revenge can be brutal. They may imprison the leaders, have thugs beat them up or harm their wives and children, and ransack their houses. It is fear of revenge that drives many collective action leaders to make removal of local officials a top-priority demand, often ignoring the wishes of the majority of their followers for a quick and practical solution. 

Conclusion      In a society where the rule of law is more honoured in its breach than observance, where democratic channels for the common people to air and seek remedy for their grievances are few, some conflicts are bound to escalate and become confrontational, resulting in a growing number of mass incidents. 
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